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The ratios of public debt as a share of GDP of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico were 12 percentage
points higher on average during the period 1996-2005 than in the period 1990-1995. Costa
Rica's debt ratio remained stable but at a high level near 50 percent. Is there reason to be
concerned for the solvency of the public sector in these economies? We provide an answer
to this question based on the quantitative predictions of a variant of the framework proposed
by Mendoza and Oviedo (2006). This methodology yields forward-looking estimates of debt
ratios that are consistent with ¯scal solvency for a government that faces revenue uncertainty
and can issue only non-state-contingent debt. In this environment, aversion to a collapse in
outlays leads the government to respect a \natural debt limit" equal to the annuity value of the
primary balance in a \¯scal crisis." A ¯scal crisis occurs after a long sequence of adverse revenue
shocks and public outlays adjust to their tolerable minimum. The debt limit also represents
a credible commitment to remain able to repay even in a ¯scal crisis. The debt limit is not,
in general, the same as the sustainable debt, which is driven by the probabilistic dynamics of
the primary balance. The results of a baseline scenario question the sustainability of current
debt ratios in Brazil and Colombia, while those in Costa Rica and Mexico are inside the limits
consistent with ¯scal solvency. In contrast, current debt ratios are found to be unsustainable
in all four countries for plausible changes to lower average growth rates or higher real interest
rates. Moreover, sustainable debt ratios fall sharply when default risk is taken into account.
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Comparing recent ¯gures with those at the beginning of the 1990s reveals that public debt-to-
GDP ratios have been rising steadily in Latin America during the last 15 years (see Figure 1).
In particular, the Colombian and Brazilian debt ratios increased by 15.7 and 11.5 percentage
points; in Mexico, before a recent decrease, the debt ratio had risen from 41 percent in
1990 to 50 percent in 2003; and the Costa Rican public debt has been °uctuating around
50 percentage points of GDP for more than 10 years. Given that growing public debt has
traditionally been an indicator of ¯nancial weakness and vulnerability to economic crisis in
the region, there is concern for assessing whether the observed high levels of debt are in line
with the solvency of the public sector or should be taken as a warning signal that requires
policy intervention.
The goal of this paper is to assess the consistency of public debt ratios in Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica and Mexico with the conditions required to maintain ¯scal solvency. The debt
dynamics in these countries are also compared with the recent polar experiences in Chile and
Argentina, two Latin American countries that had approximately the same debt-to-GDP
ratio at the beginning of the 1990s and that ended in opposite extremes by the mid 2000s
(see Figure 1b); whereas the Chilean stock of public debt fell down to zero, the Argentine
debt ratio leapt above 100 percent before the country defaulted on its debt in 2001.
The ¯scal solvency assessment conducted in this paper is based on the framework proposed
by Mendoza and Oviedo (2006). In particular, this paper applies a variant of their model
that abstracts from the behavior of the private sector to focus on a simpli¯ed version of
the government's problem characterized by exogenous government-expenditure rules. This
methodology produces estimates of the short- and long-run dynamics of public debt ratios in
a setup in which public revenues are subject to random shocks and the government aims to
maintain its outlays relatively smooth. The government is handicapped in its e®orts to play
this insurer's role because it can only issue non-state contingent debt.
Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) show that in this environment with incomplete contingent-
claims markets, a government averse to a collapse in its public outlays and facing revenue
uncertainty will impose on itself a \natural debt limit" (NDL) determined by the growth-
adjusted annuity value of the primary balance in a state of \¯scal crisis." The state of ¯scal
1crisis is the state at which a country arrives after experiencing a su±ciently long sequence
of adverse shocks to public revenues on one side, and after adjusting the ¯scal outlays to a
minimum admissible level on the other.
An important implication of the NDL is that it allows the government to o®er its creditors
a credible commitment to remain able to repay \almost surely" at all times, even during ¯scal
crises. This commitment is not an ad-hoc assumption but an implication of the assumptions
that (a) the government is averse to su®ering a collapse of its outlays, (b) public revenues are
stochastic, and (c) markets of contingent claims are incomplete. However, the commitment
is in terms of an \ability-to-pay criterion," and as such it does not rule out default scenarios
that may result from \willingness-to-pay" or strategic reasons.
The NDL sets the upper bound for public debt but is not, in general, the same as the
\sustainable" or equilibrium level of debt. The model does not require public debt to remain
constant at the level of the NDL. Indeed, in Mendoza and Oviedo's (2006) model, while the
government's NDL is equal 132 percent of GDP, the long-run average of the debt ratio is
equal to 53 percent of GDP. In the short-run, the dynamics of the distribution of public debt
are driven by the government budget constraint and depends on the initial debt and revenue
conditions, the probabilistic process driving revenues, and the policy rules governing public
outlays.
Under the limiting assumption made here that the government keeps an invariant level
of non-interest ¯scal outlays except when it faces the state of ¯scal crisis, in the long run,
the government can end up paying o® all its debt or hitting the debt limit. Which long-run
equilibrium will be reached depends on the alternative sequences of realizations of public
revenues and the initial ¯scal conditions including the initial stock of public debt. On the
contrary, the general equilibrium framework in Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) features a unique,
invariant long-run distribution of public debt, as the government uses its access to debt
markets to optimize the use of its outlays over time.
The results of the ¯scal-solvency assessment of this paper suggest that current debt ra-
tios in Brazil and Colombia are near the natural debt limits that would be consistent with
¯scal solvency only if one assumes perceived commitments to large reductions in non-interest
outlays during a ¯scal crisis. For instance, Brazil and Colombia should be able to cut their
outlays by 6.2 and 10.6 percentage points of GDP. The di±culty of observing such large
2outlays reductions can be illustrated considering the recent Argentine experience in which
avoiding defaulting on the sovereign debt would have required outlays cutbacks of at least
5.2 percentage points of GDP. Mexico and Costa Rica were also near their debt limits in
1998 and 2003, respectively. However, the reductions in outlays that would have been needed
to keep the governments in these two countries solvent if revenues had continued to su®er
adverse shocks were smaller (at 2 and 3.7 percentage points of GDP, respectively).
The above results are very sensitive to the underlying assumptions regarding the long-run
real interest and growth rates. Current debt ratios in all four examined countries are found
to be unsustainable for plausible reductions in growth rates to the averages of the last 25
years, instead of the average of the last 45 years used in the baseline scenario. Similarly, the
current debt ratios are found to be unsustainable if the long-run real interest rate is set at 8
percent instead of the 5 percent value of the baseline estimates.
The Mendoza-Oviedo framework was designed as a forward-looking policy tool that in-
tentionally sets aside the default risk. This was done because the framework is intended to
produce the sustainable debt ratio that a government that does not consider the option of
defaulting on its obligations could support. This is in line with the assumptions of the tradi-
tional approaches to assess debt sustainability based on deterministic steady-state estimates
or empirical applications of the intertemporal government budget constraint. However, while
abstracting from sovereign default serves to set the ideal benchmark in a forward-looking
policy analysis, the strategy does have the drawback that it does not take into account how
default risk considerations could a®ect sustainable debt dynamics. To address this issue,
this paper studies how estimates of natural debt limits and simulated debt dynamics vary
when the basic Mendoza-Oviedo model is modi¯ed to incorporate exogenous default risk.
Introducing default risk results in marked reductions in the levels of natural debt limits.
The paper also compares the results of the Mendoza-Oviedo model with those produced by
the conventional methodology based on calculations of steady-state debt ratios (or \Blanchard
ratios"). In countries with large average primary surpluses such as Costa Rica and Mexico, the
Blanchard ratio yields higher debt ratios than the natural debt limits of the Mendoza-Oviedo
model. This shows that assessments of sustainable debt based on steady-state calculations
that use averages of revenues and outlays and fail to take into account aggregate, non-
insurable ¯scal shocks can lead countries to borrow more than what is consistent with ¯scal
3solvency. In contrast, in countries with small average primary surpluses, the Blanchard ratios
would yield negligible debt ratios. The Mendoza-Oviedo model can explain high levels of debt
when the governments can credibly commit to large enough cuts in outlays in a state of ¯scal
crisis. To be credible, however, these cuts must not represent unusually large deviations
relative to the historical mean.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a short survey of the existing
methods for calculating public debt ratios consistent with ¯scal solvency. Section 3 summa-
rizes the one-good variant of the Mendoza-Oviedo model. Section 4 applies the model to the
cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico and discusses the results. This Section
includes sensitivity analysis and an extension to incorporate exogenous default risk. Section
5 re°ects on important caveats of the analysis and provides general conclusions.
2 Computing Public Debt Ratios Consistent with Fis-
cal Solvency: A Survey
Developing e®ective tools for determining whether a stock of debt is \sustainable" or not,
in the sense of being consistent with the ¯scal solvency conditions implied by current and
future patterns of government revenue and outlays, has proven a di±cult task. The ¯rst
problem that studies in this area face is how to give operational content to the notion of
¯scal sustainability. There is a tendency to associate the notion of unsustainable public debt
with failure to satisfy the government budget constraint, or with the government holding a
negative net-worth position.
From an analytical standpoint, however, focusing on either the budget constraint or on
the net-worth position of the government can be misleading. This is because the \true"
government budget constraint, interpreted as an accounting identity relating the overall public
sector borrowing requirement to all sources and uses of government revenue, must always hold.
Thus, an analysis that shows that a given stock of public debt fails a \particular" de¯nition
of the budget constraint is ultimately re°ecting the failure to incorporate into the analysis
important features of the actual ¯scal situation of the country under study. How this failure
translates into a judgment about the sustainability of public debt depends on assessments
(typically implicit in the analysis) about the macroeconomic outcomes associated with the
4di®erent mechanisms open to maintain ¯scal balance.
Arguments about sustainability are therefore implicitly arguments about the pros and cons
of these alternative mechanisms, not about whether the government's intertemporal budget
constraint holds. Consider a basic example. The canonical long-run analysis of public debt
sustainability considers long-run, average levels of public revenue and expenditures, and views
as the sustainable debt-output ratio the annuity value of a long-run target of the primary
balance-output ratio. If a government has a large stock of contingent liabilities because of
the high risk of a banking crisis, the stock of public debt may be judged to be unsustainable
because, once these contingent liabilities are added, the debt-output ratio exceeds the long-
run indicator of sustainability. However, the government budget constraint must hold, and
thus if a banking crisis does occur, the government will ultimately have to adjust the primary
balance or rely on other \sources" of ¯nancing such as the in°ation tax or a debt default.
Adjustments via the primary balance are generally judged as consistent with this canonical
view of sustainability, while adjustments via in°ation or default would not because these
would be viewed as alternatives inferior to adjustment of the primary balance in terms of
social welfare.
Beyond the problem of de¯ning an operational concept of public debt sustainability, there
are also problems in the design of methods for calculating sustainable debt levels. These di±-
culties re°ect the gap between the aspects of ¯scal policy emphasized in the di®erent methods
and those aspects that seem empirically relevant for explaining the actual ¯scal position. The
literature on methods for assessing public debt sustainability re°ects the evolution of ideas
on these issues. The lines below review the main features of the di®erent methods. The
intent is not to conduct a comprehensive survey of the literature but to highlight the central
di®erences among the existing methods.1
The starting point of most of the existing methods for calculating sustainable public debt-
output ratios is the period budget constraint of the government. This constraint is merely
an accounting identity that relates all the °ows of government receipts and payments to the
change in public debt:
Bt+1 = Bt(1 + rt) ¡ (Tt ¡ Gt) (1)
where Bt+1 is the stock of public debt issued by the end of period t; Bt is maturing public
1For literature surveys see Chalk and Hemming (2000), or IMF (2002) and (2003).
5debt on which the government pays principal and the real interest rate rt; Tt is total real
government revenue; and Gt represents current, real, non-interest government outlays, so that
Tt ¡ Gt is the primary ¯scal balance.
Long-Run Methods
The canonical long-run approach to debt sustainability is based on steady-state, perfect-
foresight considerations that transform the government's accounting identity (1) into an
equation that maps the long-run primary ¯scal balance as a share of output into a \sus-
tainable" debt-to-output ratio that remains constant over time (see Buiter,1985; Blanchard,
1990; and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor, 1990). In particular, when ° is the






where b is the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio, ¿ and g are the long-run GDP shares of current
revenue and outlays, and r is the steady-state real interest rate. Condition (2) can be read
as an indicator of ¯scal policy action (i.e., of the \permanent" primary balance-output ratio
that needs to be achieved by means of revenue or expenditure policies so as to stabilize
a given debt-output ratio), or as an indicator of a \sustainable" debt ratio (i.e., the target
debt-output ratio implied by a given projection of the long-run primary balance-output ratio).
Intertemporal Methods
An important shortcoming of the long-run approach is that it fails to recognize that the \long
run" is a theoretical construct. In the short run governments face a budget constraint that
does not reduce to the simplistic formula of the long-run analysis. There can be temporarily
high debt ratios, or temporarily large primary de¯cits, that are consistent with government
solvency, and indeed incurring in such temporarily high debt or de¯cits could be optimal
from a tax-smoothing perspective. To force a country into the straight jacket of keeping its
public debt-output ratio no larger than the level that corresponds to the long-run stationary
state can therefore be a serious mistake.
The realization of these °aws in the long-run calculations led to the development of
6intertemporal-budget-constraint methods that shifted the focus from analyzing directly the
debt-output ratio to studying the time-series properties of the ¯scal balance, so as to test
whether these properties are consistent with the conditions required to satisfy the govern-
ment's intertemporal budget constraint. This intertemporal constraint serves as a means
to link the short-run dynamics of debt and the primary balance with the long-run solvency
constraint of the government.
In their original form (see Hamilton and Flavin, 1986) the intertemporal methods aimed
to test whether the data rejected the hypothesis that the condition ruling out Ponzi games
on public debt holds. This condition states that at any date t the discounted value of
the stock of public debt t + j periods into the future should vanish as j goes to in¯nity:
limj!1 ¦
j
k=0(1+rt+k)¡1Bt+1+j = 0. In other words, in the long run the stock of debt cannot
grow faster than the gross interest rate. If this no-Ponzi-game (NPG) condition holds, the
forward solution of (1) implies that the intertemporal government budget constraint holds.
Namely, the present value of the primary ¯scal balance is equal to the value of the existing
stock of debt, and hence the existing public debt or public debt-output ratio is deemed
\sustainable."
A number of articles tried di®erent variations of this test by testing for stationarity and
co-integration in the time series of the primary balance and public debt, and produced dif-
ferent results using U.S. data (Chalk and Hemming, 2000, review this literature). These
intertemporal-budget-constraint methods have also introduced elements of uncertainty into
public debt sustainability analysis, but mostly in an indirect manner as sources of statisti-
cal error in hypothesis testing, or by testing the NPG condition in expected value or as an
orthogonality condition.2
Bohn (1998) provided an alternative interpretation of intertemporal methods that reduces
to testing if the primary balance responds positively to increases in public debt. In particular,
if the primary balance-output ratio and the debt-output ratio are stationary, the following
2The orthogonality condition considers that, at equilibrium, the sequence of real interest rates used to
discount the \terminal" debt stock must match the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in private










where Et is the expectation operator that conditions on the information available at time t; u0(Ct) is the
marginal utility of consumption at time t; and ¯ is the standard exponential discount factor.
7regression can be used to test for sustainability:
st = ½bt + ® ¢ Zt + ²t (3)
where st is the ratio of the primary ¯scal balance over GDP, ²t is a well-behaved error term and
Zt is a vector of determinants of the primary balance other than the initial stock of public
debt. In Bohn's case, these determinants included a measure of \abnormal" government
expenditures associated to war episodes and the cyclical variations in U.S. GDP. Bohn found
strong evidence in favor of ½ > 0 which indicates that, controlling for war-time spending and
the business cycle, the debt-output ratio was mean-reverting in U.S. Moreover, a systematic
and positive linear response of the primary balance to increases in the stock of debt is su±cient
(albeit not necessary) to ensure that the intertemporal government budget constraint holds.
The intuition is that if a \large negative shock" raises considerably the stock of public debt
above its mean, then primary surpluses are going to eventually reverse that stock of debt to
its mean level.
Chapter III of IMF (2003) applied Bohn's method to a panel of industrial and developing
country data and found that the condition ½ > 0 held for some but not all developing
countries. Moreover, the study found evidence of non-linearities in the relationship between
debt and primary balances. This evidence indicates that countries that were able to sustain
larger debt ratios in the data also displayed a stronger response of the primary balance to
debt increases.
Recent Development: Probabilistic Methods and Methods with Fi-
nancial Frictions
Recent developments in public debt sustainability analysis follow two strands. One empha-
sizes that governments, particularly in emerging markets, face signi¯cant sources of uncer-
tainty as they try to assess the patterns of government revenue and expenditures, and hence
the level of debt that they can a®ord to maintain. From the perspective of these probabilistic
methods, measures of sustainability derived from the long-run approach or the intertemporal
analysis are seen as inaccurate for governments that hold large stocks of debt and face large
shocks to their revenues and expenditures. The key question here is not whether public debt
8is sustainable at some abstract steady state, or whether in a sample of a country's recent or
historical past the NPG condition holds. The key question is whether the current debt-output
ratio is sustainable given the current domestic and international economic environment and
its future prospects.
The second strand aims to incorporate elements of the ¯nancial frictions literature applied
to the recent emerging-markets crises. For example, public debt in many emerging markets
displays a characteristic referred to as \liability dollarization" (i.e., debt is often denominated
in foreign currency or indexed to the price level). As a result, abrupt changes in domestic
relative prices that are common in the aftermath of a large devaluation, or a `sudden stop'
to net capital in°ows, can alter dramatically standard long-run calculations of sustainable
debt ratios and render levels of debt that looked sustainable in one situation unsustainable in
another. Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) evaluate these e®ects for the Argentine case and
¯nd that large changes in the relative price of nontradables alter signi¯cantly the assessments
obtained with standard steady-state sustainability analysis.
The probabilistic methods for assessing ¯scal sustainability propose alternative strategies
for dealing with macroeconomic uncertainty. A method proposed at the IMF by Barnhill
and Kopits (2003) incorporates uncertainty by adapting the value-at-risk (VaR) principles of
the ¯nance industry to debt instruments issued by governments. The aim of this approach is
to model the probability of a negative net worth position for the government. The method
requires estimates of the present values of the main elements of the balance sheet of the total
consolidated public sector (¯nancial assets and liabilities, expected revenues from sales of
commodities or other goods and services, as well as any contingent assets and liabilities), and
an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the variables that are viewed as determinants
of those present values in reduced form. This information is then used to compute measures
of dispersion relative to the present values of the di®erent assets and liabilities that determine
the value at risk (or exposure to negative net worth) of the government.
A second probabilistic method recently considered for country surveillance at the IMF
(see IMF, 2003) modi¯es the long-run method to incorporate variations to the determinants
of sustainable public debt in the right-hand-side of equation (2), and also examines short-
term debt dynamics that result from di®erent assumptions about the short-run path of the
variables that enter the government budget constraint in deterministic form. For example,
9deterministic debt dynamics up to 10 periods into the future are computed for variations of
the growth rate of output of two standard deviations relative to its mean.
The same IMF publication proposes a stochastic simulation approach that computes the
probability density function of possible debt-output ratios. This stochastic simulation model,
like the VaR approach, is based on a non-structural time-series analysis of the macroeconomic
variables that drive the dynamics of public debt (particularly output growth, interest rates,
and the primary balance). The di®erence is that the stochastic simulation model produces
simulated probability distributions based on forward simulations of a vector-autoregression
model that combines the determinants of debt dynamics as endogenous variables with a vector
of exogenous variables. The distributions are then used to make assessments of sustainable
debt in terms of the probability that the simulated debt ratios are greater or equal than a
critical value.
Xu and Ghezzi (2003) developed a third probabilistic method to evaluate sustainable
public debt. Their method computes \fair spreads" on public debt that re°ect the default
probabilities implied by a continuous-time stochastic model of the dynamics of treasury re-
serves in which exchange rates, interest rates, and the primary ¯scal balance follow Brownian
motion processes (so that they capture drift and volatility observed in the data). The anal-
ysis is similar to that of the ¯rst-generation models of balance-of-payments crises. Default
occurs when treasury reserves are depleted, and thus debt is deemed unsustainable when the
properties of the underlying Brownian motions are such that the expected value of treasury
reserves declines to zero (which occurs at an exponential rate).
3 A Basic Version of the Mendoza-Oviedo Model
The probabilistic methods summarized in the last section make signi¯cant progress in incorpo-
rating macroeconomic uncertainty into debt sustainability analysis but they are largely based
on non-structural econometric methods. In contrast, the Mendoza-Oviedo (MO) method aims
to provide an explicit dynamic equilibrium model of the mechanism by which macroeconomic
shocks a®ect government ¯nances. The MO method also di®ers from the other probabilistic
methods in that it models explicitly the nature of the government's forward-looking commit-
ment to remain solvent, instead of focusing on computing estimates of exposure to negative
10net worth or depletion of treasury reserves. As explained below, the MO method determines
sustainable debt ratios that respect a natural debt limit consistent with a credible com-
mitment to repay similar in principle to the one implicit in the long-run and intertemporal
methods.
The structural emphasis of the MO approach comes at the cost of the reduced °exibility
and increased complexity of the numerical solution methods required to solve non-linear,
dynamic stochastic equilibrium models with incomplete asset markets. At the same time, by
proceeding in this manner the MO framework seeks to produce estimates of sustainable public
debt that are robust to the Lucas critique. The non-structural or reduced-form tools used in
the other probabilistic methods to model the dynamics of public debt are vulnerable to the
policy instability problems resulting from the Lucas critique. This is not a serious limitation
when these methods are used for an ex-post evaluation of how well past debt dynamics
matched ¯scal solvency conditions, but it can be a shortcoming for a forward-looking analysis
that requires a framework for describing how equilibrium prices and allocations, and hence
the ability of the government to raise revenue and service debt, adjust to alternative tax and
expenditure policies or other changes in the environment.
The basic principles of the MO method are as follows. Assume that output follows a
deterministic trend so that it grows at a constant, exogenous rate, °, and the real interest rate,
r, is constant. Public revenues follow an exogenous stochastic process and the government is
averse to su®ering a collapse in its outlays. Hence, it aims to keep its outlays smooth unless
the loss of access to debt markets forces it to adjust these outlays to minimum tolerable levels.
Domestic debt markets are incomplete so the government can only issue non-state-contingent
debt. The government budget constraint in (1) can then be re-written as:
(1 + °)bt+1 = bt(1 + r) ¡ (¿t ¡ gt) (4)
where lowercase letters refer to ratios relative to GDP.
Since the government wants to rule out a collapse of its outlays below their tolerable
minimum levels, it would not want to hold more debt than the amount it could service if the
primary balance were to remain forever (or \almost surely" in the language of probability
theory) at its lowest value, or \¯scal crisis" state. A state of ¯scal crisis is de¯ned as a situation
11reached after a \su±ciently" long sequence of the worst realization of public revenues and
after public outlays have been adjusted to their tolerable minimum. This upper bound on
debt is labeled the \Natural Debt Limit" (NDL), which is the term used in the precautionary-
savings literature for an analogous debt limit that private agents impose on themselves when
they can only use non-state-contingent assets to smooth consumption (see Aiyagari, 1994).
The NDL is given by the growth-adjusted annuity value of the primary balance in the state
of ¯scal crisis.
The \history of events" leading to a ¯scal crisis has non-zero probability (although it could
be a very low probability) as long as that crisis state is an event within the support of the
probability distribution of the primary balance, and as long as there are non-zero conditional
probabilities of moving into this crisis state from other realizations of the primary balance.
Inasmuch as the government internalizes that there is some probability that it could su®er
a ¯scal crisis in the future, the government must not hold more debt than it could service
while paying for the crisis level of outlays.
Since the NDL is a time-invariant debt level that satis¯es the government budget con-
straint with revenues and outlays set at their minimum, it follows that the NDL implies that
the government remains able to service its debt even in a state of ¯scal crisis. Thus, the NDL
that a government imposes on itself to self-insure against the collapse of public outlays below
its tolerable minimum also allows that government to o®er lenders a credible commitment to
remain able to repay its debt in all states of nature.
To turn the above notions of the NDL and their implied credible commitment to repay
into operational concepts, one needs to be speci¯c about the factors that determine the
probabilistic dynamics of the components of the primary balance. On the revenue side, the
probabilistic processes driving tax revenues re°ect the uncertainty a®ecting tax rates and tax
bases. These processes have one component that is the result of domestic policy variability
and the endogenous response of the economy to this variability, and another component that
is largely exogenous to the domestic economy (which typically results from the nontrivial
e®ects of factors like °uctuations in commodity prices and commodity exports on government
revenues). The version of the MO model used in this paper incorporates explicitly the second
component.3
3Note that the exogenous determinants of public revenue dynamics can be important even in economies
12On the expenditure side, government expenditures adjust largely in response to policy
decisions, but the manner in which they respond varies widely across countries.4 In addition,
the \adjustment" or minimum level of public outlays to which the government can commit to
adjust in a ¯scal crisis is particularly important for determining the NDL and the sustainable
debt ratios in the MO model. Labeling the ¯scal-crisis level (or lowest realization) of the
government revenue-GDP ratio as ¿min and the minimum level of the ratio of outlays to GDP
that the government can commit to deliver as gmin (for gmin < ¿min), it follows from the






This NDL is lower for governments that have (a) higher variability in public revenues, (b) less
°exibility to adjust public outlays, and (c) lower growth rates or higher real interest rates.
The NDL represents a credible commitment to repay in the sense that it ensures that the
government remains able to repay even in a state of ¯scal crisis for a given known stochastic
process driving revenues and a given policy setting the minimum level of outlays. However,
this should not be interpreted as suggesting that the need to respect the NDL rules out the
possibility of sovereign default. Default triggered by \inability to pay" remains possible if
there are large, unexpected shocks that drive revenues below what was perceived to be the
value of ¿min or if the government turns out to be unable to reduce outlays to gmin when a
¯scal crisis hits. In addition, default triggered by \unwillingness to pay" remains possible
since the NDL is only an ability to pay criterion that cannot rule out default for strategic
reasons. Section 4 explores an extension of this framework that incorporates default risk into
the basic MO setup.
Consider a government with exogenous, random ¯scal revenues (say, for example, oil
export revenues) and an ad-hoc smoothing policy rule for government expenditures, such
that gt = g (for g ¸ gmin) as long as bt+1 ¸ b¤, otherwise gt adjusts to satisfy condition (5).
By (4) and (5), if at a particular date the current debt ratio is below b¤ and the realization
that have successfully diversi¯ed their exports away from primary commodities. In Mexico, for example, oil
exports are less than 15 percent of total exports but oil-related revenues still represent more than 1/3 of
public sector revenue.
4For instance, it is known that whereas government spending is counter-cyclical in industrial countries, it
tends to be acyclical or slightly procyclical in developing countries; see for example Gavin and Perotti (1997)
and Talvi and V¶ egh (2005).
13of the revenue-output ratio is ¿min, the government ¯nances g by increasing bt+1. In contrast,
if at some date the current debt ratio is at b¤ and the realization of revenues is ¿min, (4) and
(5) imply that gt = gmin. In a simple example with zero initial debt, it is straightforward to
show that if the government keeps drawing the minimum realization of public revenue, it will







g ¡ ¿min (6)
This result indicates that, in the worst-case scenario in which revenues remain \almost surely"
at their minimum, the government can access the debt market to keep the ratio of public
outlays at the level g for a longer period of time the larger is the excess of \normal" government
outlays over minimum government outlays relative to the excess of normal outlays over the
minimum level of revenues. Thus, the government uses debt to keep its outlays as smooth
as possible given its capacity to service debt as determined by the volatility of its public
revenues, re°ected in the value of ¿min, and its ability to reduce public outlays in a ¯scal
crisis, re°ected in the value of gmin.
The key element of the expenditure policy is not the level of gmin per se but the credibility
of the announcement that outlays would be so reduced during a ¯scal crunch. The ability
to sustain debt and the credibility of this announcement depend on each other because a
government with a credible ex ante commitment to major expenditure cuts during a ¯scal
crisis can borrow more and access the debt market for longer time; hence, everything else the
same, this government faces a lower probability to be called to act on its commitment. In a
more general case in which public revenue is not an exogenous probabilistic process but it is in
part the result of tax policies and their interaction with endogenous tax bases, the credibility
argument extends to tax policy. Governments that can credibly commit to generate higher
and less volatile tax revenue-output ratios will be able to sustain higher levels of debt, and
to the extent that this helps the economy produce stable tax bases, it helps to support the
credibility of the government's ability to raise revenue.
The condition de¯ning the NDL in (5) has a similar form as the formula for calculating
sustainable debt ratios under the long-run method: b = (¿ ¡ g)=(r ¡ °). However, the
implications for assessing ¯scal sustainability under the two methods are sharply di®erent.
14The long-run deterministic rule always identi¯es as sustainable debt-output ratios that are
unsustainable once uncertainty on the determinants of the ¯scal balance and the NDL are
taken into account. This is because the long-run method ignores the role of the volatility of
the elements of the ¯scal balance; on the contrary, the MO model ¯nds that, everything else
the same, governments with less variability in tax revenues can sustain higher debt ratios.
Consider the case of two governments with identical long-run averages of tax revenue-
output ratios at 20 percent. The tax revenue-output ratio of government A has a standard
deviation of 1 percent relative to the mean, while that of Government B has a standard
deviation of 5 percent relative to the mean. Assuming for simplicity that the distributions
of tax revenue-output ratios are Markov processes with ¿min set at two standard deviations
below the mean, the probabilistic model would compute the natural debt limit for A using a
value of ¿min of 18 percent, while for B it would use 10 percent. The deterministic long-run
method yields the same debt ratio for both governments and uses the common 20 percent
average tax revenue-output ratio to compute it. In contrast, the MO method would ¯nd that
debt ratio unsustainable for both governments and would produce a debt limit for B that is
lower than that for A.
The two methods also di®er on the role given to the limiting debt ratios. In the long-run
analysis, the steady-state debt ratio is viewed either as a target ratio to which a government
should be forced to move to, or as the anchor for a target primary balance-GDP ratio that
should be achieved by means of a policy correction. In contrast, the NDL in the MO method
only de¯nes the maximum level of debt. Unless the NDL binds, that maximum is not the
equilibrium or sustainable level of debt that should be issued by the government, although
it plays a central role in determining both. Furthermore, according to the MO method, a
country can have levels of debt much lower than the NDL and may take a very long time on
average to enter a state of ¯scal crisis or even never arrive at it.
The MO methodology models uncertainty in the form of discrete Markov processes. Given
the information on the current stock of public debt, the current tax revenue-GDP ratio and
the assumed behavioral rules for government outlays and statistical moments of the public
revenue process, the model produces conditional one-period-ahead and unconditional long-
run distributions of the debt-output ratio, as well as estimates of the average number of
periods in which b¤ is expected to be reached from any initial b0. Depending on the nature
15of the random processes and policy rules of revenues and outlays, it may take a few quarters
to hit the debt ceiling on average, or it may take an in¯nite number of quarters to do it.
4 Results of the MO Method for Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Mexico
This section applies the MO method to four Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Mexico. The debt dynamics and their determinants in these countries are
compared with those observed in two recent polar experiences in Argentina and Chile, charac-
terized, respectively, by debt default and full repayment. Seeking to identify key parameters
needed to simulate the debt dynamics and solve for the natural debt limits, the section begins
with a brief review of the recent growth performance and evolution of the ¯scal variables.
The data sources are detailed in the Appendix.
Review of Growth Performance and Fiscal Dynamics
Over the last 25 years, the growth performance of the four countries examined in this study
was weak. As shown in Table 1, average growth in GDP per capita for the period 1981-2005
was less than one-half of a percent in Brazil, 0.8 percent in Mexico, and around one-and-a-
quarter percent in Colombia and Costa Rica. These countries grew at faster rates in the past.
Taking averages starting in 1961, the smallest and largest average per-capita GDP growth
rate were 1.86 percent (Colombia) and 2.3 percent (Brazil). As for the growth rate in the two
reference countries, Table 1 shows that the average growth rate was higher (lower) in Chile
(Argentina) than in the four examined countries.
Given the apparent structural breaks in the trend of GDP per capita, the public debt
analysis below de¯nes a baseline growth scenario that uses the 1961-2005 average growth
rates, and compares the results with those of a scenario that views the growth slowdown of
the last two decades as permanent by using 1981-2005 average growth rates.
Table 1 shows that among the four examined countries, the mean debt-to-GDP ratio for
the full sample ranged from 37.5 percent in Colombia to 50.3 percent in Costa Rica.5 In
5Reliable cross-country estimates of public debt stocks at the general government level are hard to obtain.
As detailed in the Appendix, we use statistics available from national sources and from the IMF, so it must
16sharp contrast with these ratios, the average ratios in Chile and Argentina were 7.8 and 60.7
percent respectively. These full-sample averages, however, hide the evidence shown in Figure
1 that debt ratios have been in general growing rapidly, except in Costa Rica where the
stock of debt has remained high (at around 50 percent). By splitting the sample to create
averages for 1990-1995 and 1996-2005, one ¯nds that the mean debt ratios of Mexico, Brazil,
and Colombia increased by about 10, 12, and 14 percentage points between the ¯rst and the
second periods. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, during the second period all the four
examined countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico) displayed debt ratios around
55 percent at some point in time, as it happened in Argentina before defaulting on its debt.
A key question to answer is whether a debt ratio around 55 percent is consistent with ¯scal
solvency given the pattern of growth, interest rates, and the ¯scal-revenue volatilities faced
by these countries.
Real interest rates on public debt are hard to measure because public debt instruments
di®er in maturity, currency denomination, indexation factors, and residence of creditors.
One proxy is the measure of sovereign risk proposed by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), which
is the spread of the EMBI+ index relative to the U.S. T-Bill rate de°ated by an estimate of
expected in°ation in the U.S. GDP de°ator. The sample period of this measure is relatively
short (starting in 1994) and biased because it includes mainly observations for a turbulent
period in world capital markets. Thus, this measure of real interest rates on public debt
shows substantial premia over the world's risk free rate and can be taken as an upper bound
estimate of the interest rate. For instance, the averages for a quarterly sample from 1994:1
to 2002:2 are 12.9 percent for Brazil and 10.3 percent for Mexico. The lower bound would
be the real interest rate on U.S. public debt. The 1981:1-2005:4 average of the U.S. 90 day
T-bill rate de°ated by observed U.S. CPI in°ation is about 2.17 percent.
Given the above considerations about measurement of interest rates on public debt and
the observations of the average U.S. T-bill rate of 2.17 percent and the Brazilian average real
interest rate on foreign sovereign debt of 13 percent, two interest-rate scenarios are considered.
In the baseline scenario, the real interest rate is set equal to 5 percent, which represents a
small premium of about twice the U.S. T-bill rate. The alternative is a high-real-interest-
rate scenario characterized by an 8 percent interest rate. Both scenarios remain relatively
be noticed that the reported data may not be strictly comparable across countries.
17optimistic about growth prospects, using the average growth rates of the period 1961-2005.
The measure of public revenues needed for conducting the debt-sustainability analysis is
the total of all tax and non-tax government revenues excluding grants. Government expendi-
tures should comprise total non-interest government outlays, including all expenditures and
transfer payments and excluding all forms of debt service. Limitations of the existing inter-
national databases make it di±cult to retrieve consistent measures of these variables that
apply at the level of the entire non-¯nancial public sector and, in the case of the outlays, that
include the annuity values of all contingent liabilities resulting from obligations like banking-
or pension-system bailouts. We put together estimates of the revenues and outlays ratios by
combining data from national sources with IMF and World Bank data (see Appendix).
The average ratios of total public revenues to GDP during the period 1990-2005 in the
four examined countries ranged from 21 percent in Mexico to 32 percent in Costa Rica (see
Table 1). The volatilities of the public revenues were relatively low in Costa Rica and Mexico
with coe±cients of variation of the revenue-output ratios at 7 and 7.8 percent of the mean. At
the other end, Colombia showed the highest coe±cient of variation of public revenues at 18.5
percent. Comparing these ¯gures with those of the two reference countries, one notes that
in terms of averages, the Argentine public revenue ratios were lower than the ratios observed
in the four examined countries; on the other hand, the coe±cients of variation of the public
revenue ratios in the four examined countries have largely exceeded the Chilean 4.2 percent
ratio.
Turning to the other component of the primary ¯scal balance, the average non-interest
outlays-to-GDP ratio during the period 1990-2005 was relatively low in Mexico at 18.4 per-
cent, and relatively high in the other three examined countries where the ratio ranged between
24.6 and 29.6 percent. The volatilities of these outlays ratios were lower in Mexico (7.2 per-
cent) and Costa Rica (9 percent) than in Brazil (14.7 percent) and Colombia (23.3 percent).
Interestingly, Chile, the reference country that payed o® its debt, displayed the lowest average
and the second-to-lowest volatility of the non-interest outlays ratio.
Natural Debt Limits: Baseline Scenario and Two Alternatives
Table 1 reports three sets of calculations of natural debt limits for Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica and Mexico. The baseline scenario considers the 1961-2005 average growth rates of GDP
18per capita and a 5 percent real interest rate. The growth-slowdown (GS) scenario uses the
1981-2005 average growth rates and keeps the real interest rate at 5 percent. The high-real-
interest-rate (HRIR) scenario uses a real interest rate of 8 percent and sets the growth rates
equal to the 1961-2005 averages.
The baseline scenario di®ers from the other two because it is designed to produce a coef-
¯cient of ¯scal adjustment that yields a NDL equal to the largest debt ratio observed in each
of the four examined countries during the 1990-2005 period. Using the maximum observed
debt ratio to de¯ne the NDL in the two reference countries is, however, less meaningful. For
instance, the Argentine 164 percent ratio was clearly inconsistent with ¯scal solvency and the
high debt ratios in that country later unfolded into a debt crisis. Hence, instead of using the
maximum historic debt ratios, the NDLs in Argentina and Chile are both set equal to the
average of the maximums debt ratios in the four examined countries, which is equal to 55.7
percent.
Table 1 reports the coe±cient of \implied ¯scal adjustment". This coe±cient indicates
the number of standard deviations relative to the mean that non-interest outlays should
be lowered so as to yield a debt limit equal to the NDL. The implied ¯scal adjustment is
calculated taken as given the data for means and coe±cients of variation of revenues and
outlays, the average growth rates, and the assumed real interest rate. The calculation uses
°oors of public revenues equal to two standard deviations below the corresponding means
and solves for the minimum value of non-interest outlays consistent with the NDL according
to the de¯nition given in eq. (5). The table also shows the implied minimum ratio of outlays
to GDP resulting from the coe±cient of ¯scal adjustment. The GS and HRIR scenario keep
the same ¯scal adjustment coe±cient and just alter either the growth rate or the real interest
rate.
The public debt-GDP ratios of the four countries under study peaked at similar levels
during the 1990-2005 period (ranging from 54.5 percent in Costa Rica to 57.2 percent in
Brazil). The coe±cients of implied ¯scal adjustment reported in Table 1 show that, in
order to produce a NDL that can support the maximum observed level of debt, Brazil and
Colombia need credible commitments to undertake large cuts in their outlays if they were to
hit a ¯scal crisis. For instance, the Brazilian adjustment measures 2.5 standard deviations
below the mean of non-interest government outlays which is equivalent to asking a cutback
19in the outlays-GDP ratio of about 6.2 percentage points.
The Argentine numbers in Table 1 are illustrative of how the impossibility of implementing
large cuts in ¯scal outlays can lead to unsustainable levels of debt. With a NDL set at 55.7
percent, maintaining ¯scal solvency in Argentina would have required ¯scal-crisis cuts in non-
interest outlays equal to 2.92 standard deviations away from its historical average outlays.
This is equivalent to a 5.2 percentage point reduction in the country's outlays-GDP ratio.
The Argentine experience is diametrically di®erent from the Chilean. Chile does not require
any cut in its expenditures to sustain the 55.7 percent assumed NDL; this is because even
the two standard-deviation °oor of public revenues is higher than the average non-interest
outlays ratio.
When measured in number of standard deviations with respect to their historical means,
the Colombian, Mexican, and Costa Rican outlays-cut commitments (ranging from 1.39 to
1.64) for a scenario of ¯scal-crisis are less stringent than the Brazilian commitment. However,
the cut that the Colombian ¯scal authorities should be able to implement to maintain ¯scal
solvency in a ¯scal-crisis scenario amounts to reduce the country's outlays-GDP ratio in
10.6 percentage points, which is an extraordinarily sever ¯scal e®ort. Thus, the model is
consistent with the data in predicting that Costa Rica and Mexico, the countries with lower
public-revenue volatility, should be the ones that have a better chance of sustaining high debt
ratios.
The potential dangers of using the Blanchard ratios for conducting debt sustainability
analysis are illustrated in the baseline results. The Blanchard ratio, which would compute
a sustainable debt ratio using the di®erence between the average public revenue and the
average government outlays, yields debt ratios between 71.5 and 97.5 percent (see Table 1).
These ratios largely exceed the NDLs produced by the MO model and make evident that the
Blanchard ratios could be inconsistent with the notion of being able to honor the public debt
in any conceivable history of the public ¯nances.
Consider next the natural debt limits in the growth-slowdown (GS) and high-real-interest-
rate scenarios (HRIR). If the growth slowdown of the last two decades persists, and even
assuming that the coe±cients of ¯scal adjustment were to remain as high as estimated in
the baseline scenario, the current debt ratios would exceed the natural debt limits of all four
analyzed countries by large margins. The Argentine and Brazilian situations would be partic-
20ularly compromised (even after the Argentine debt restructuring program) because the 2005
debt ratios of 73.3 and 51.5 percent would exceed the maximum debt ratios consistent with
fully credible commitments to repay in the GS scenario by 27 percentage points (Argentina)
and 18 percentage points (Brazil).
The HRIR scenario, in which for example a retrenchment of world capital markets or the
pressure of large ¯scal de¯cits in industrial countries push the real interest rate on emerging
markets public debt to 8 percent, has even more damaging e®ects. In this case, even if the
growth rates recover to the 1961-2005 averages and even with the large ¯scal adjustment
coe±cients set in the baseline scenario, the natural debt limits of all four examined countries
fall below 29 percent. Notice, however, that the prediction of the model is not that an increase
of the interest rate to 8 percent would trigger immediate ¯scal crises in all four countries. For
a ¯scal crisis to occur immediately, the increase in the interest rate would have to be once-
and-for-all and permanent. A transitory hike in the real interest rate could be absorbed in an
analogous manner as a transitory downturn in public revenues, and hence a ¯scal crisis would
only be triggered after a su±ciently long sequence of adverse shocks. This last observation
highlights again the fact that the NDL is not (in general) the same as the sustainable or
equilibrium level of debt, which is determined by the dynamics driven by the government
budget constraint. We turn to study these dynamics next.
Debt Dynamics
The simulations of debt dynamics consider public debt-GDP ratios ranging from 0.10 to 0.50
and assume that if the government budget constraint yields a negative debt at any time, the
corresponding ¯scal surplus is rebated to the private sector as a lump-sum transfer. The
dynamics of sustainable debt can be traced from any initial public debt ratio in this interval.
However, one needs to be careful in studying the long-run dynamics of debt ratios because
this basic version of the MO model features two long-run distributions of public debt, one
converging to 0 and the other to the NDL. Which of these two distributions is attained in
the long run depends on initial conditions.
The prediction that the long-run debt ratio is not determined within the model (i.e., that
the long-run debt ratio depends on initial conditions) is not a peculiarity unique to the MO
model. The classic tax-smoothing framework of Barro (1979) predicts a similar outcome for
21the debt dynamics, and the outcome is also in line with the ¯ndings on Ramsey optimal
taxation problems in which smooth taxes are optimal taxes (see Chapter 14 of Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2004).
The stochastic processes of public revenues used in the simulations are characterized by
time-invariant Markov chains. Each country-speci¯c chain is de¯ned by three objects: an
n-element vector of realizations of the revenues, ¿, an n £ n transition probability matrix,
P, and a probability distribution for the initial value of the realization of revenues, ¼0. The
typical element of the transition probability matrix, Pij, indicates the probability of observing
revenues ¿ = ¿j in the next period given that revenues are ¿ = ¿i in the current period. For
each country, the vector of realizations of revenues has 5 elements (n=5). The lowest value
of ¿ is set two standard deviations below the mean tax revenue in each of the four countries
under analysis. We then use Tauchen's (1985) univariate quadrature method to set the rest
of the elements of the vector of realizations ¿ and the transition probability matrix P so
as to approximate the ¯rst-order autocorrelation and standard deviation of public revenues
observed in the data.
The stochastic simulations require generating a T-period time series of realizations of
revenues, i.e. ¿1;¿2;:::¿T, drawn from the Markov vector ¿. This time series is constructed
using the matrix P and realizations of a uniform random variable u 2 [0;1] as follows; if the
tax revenue at time t is equal to the value of i-th element of vector ¿, the tax revenue in
period t+1 is equal to the value of the j-th element of ¿ when the following condition holds:
j X
l=1




and, it is equal to the value of the ¯rst element of ¿ if u < Pi1.
Figure 2 illustrates the ¯rst application of the stochastic simulations; it shows the relative
frequencies of ¯scal crises in each examined country and in Argentina, for ¯ve starting values
of the debt-GDP ratio ranging from 10 to 50 percent. A ¯scal crisis occurs when the debt
ratio in a given country hits the country's NDL and the government adjusts its non-interest
outlays. The relative frequencies shown in the ¯gure were computed simulating the basic MO
model using the country-speci¯c values of the non-interest outlays, the NDLs, and simulations
of the ¯scal-revenue processes. The simulated tax revenues correspond to the realizations of
22revenues drawn from the country-calibrated Markov chains discussed above. Ten thousand
simulations of 50 observations are conducted for each starting debt ratio in each of the ¯ve
countries referred in the ¯gure. Thus, the reported relative frequencies show the probabilities
of observing a ¯scal crisis within the next 50 years in each country for each initial debt ratio.
Note that in all countries, the likelihood of a ¯scal crisis increases with the initial debt
ratio and it is equal to zero for the lowest considered initial debt ratio (10 percent) in most
of the countries; this happens because it is more likely that a given realization of the primary
balance falls short of the interest outlays when the debt ratio is high than when it is low. In
contrast, when the debt ratio is low, the primary balance exceeds the value of the interest
outlays for most of the realizations of the tax revenue and the government uses the overall
budget surplus for debt buybacks.
According to the results shown in Figure 2, taking the 1990-2005 Argentine history of
¯scal revenues into account and assuming that the non-interest outlays are not modi¯ed
except that the country hits its NDL, the probability of observing a ¯scal crisis is scarcely
lower than 100 percent when the initial debt ratio is equal to 50 percent. The result is
consistent with the recent Argentine experience in which the country was unable to honor its
debt services. The result also illustrates the danger of facing a ¯scal crisis when a country
that holds a large debt ratio does not adjust its expenditures during non-crisis times. The
Chilean case, not shown in the ¯gure, is radically di®erent from the Argentine. In Chile, if
the non-interest outlays and ¯scal revenues observed in the 1990-2005 period are observed in
the future, ¯scal solvency is guaranteed even at the 50 percent starting debt ratio.
For the initial 50 percent debt ratio, the likelihoods of observing a ¯scal crisis in Brazil
and Colombia are large at 79 and 84 percent, respectively. The probabilities of a ¯scal crisis
fall to 74 and 23 percent in Costa Rica and Mexico for the same initial debt ratio. Mexico
is the country that displays the soundest ¯scal policy; note that when the initial debt ratio
is 40 percent, which is close to the 44 percent observed in Mexico in 2005 (see Figure 1), the
probability that adverse sequences of ¯scal-revenue shocks end up causing a ¯scal crisis is
barely higher than zero (0.15 percent). On the other hand, even the lowest initial debt ratios
have high chances of producing a ¯scal crisis in Colombia. This is indicative that if the recent
evolution of the Colombian ¯scal revenues were observed in the future, ¯scal solvency could
only be guaranteed by undergoing large cutbacks in non-interest outlays. In Brazil, only debt
23ratios below 40 percent guarantee that the likelihood of a ¯scal crisis is below 40 percent.
In Figure 3 the focus changes to the most adverse ¯scal scenarios that the countries
examined in this study could face in the future. For each country and initial debt ratio,
Figure 3 reports the minimum number of periods that it took to hit a ¯scal crisis among the
10,000 conducted simulations. When the initial public debt-GDP ratio is equal to 10 percent,
a ¯scal crisis could be observed in 20 years in Brazil and in 8 years in Colombia but no single
crisis could be observed in Costa Rica and Mexico. However, for the highest initial debt ratio
(50 percent), it could only take 3 years in all countries to face a ¯scal crisis, except in Mexico
where it would take 4 years. When one thinks about the most adverse ¯scal scenario that
the countries in the region could face in the future, these results show the dangers implicit
in the recent high debt ratios observed in Latin America.
The results in Figure 2 serve to illustrate how uncertainty a®ects the dynamics of public
debt and the extent to which the maximum debt di®ers from possible equilibrium paths of
public debt. The nonappearance of the bars corresponding to some initial debt ratios in
Costa Rica and Mexico shows that the simulated debt ratios never reached the NDL in any
single time period. Consider for example the initial debt ratio approximately equal to 30
percent in Costa Rica. Whereas the extreme adverse scenario calculations demonstrate that
it is conceivable to observe a ¯scal crisis within the next 3 years, only in approximately half
of the simulations, the debt ratio hits its maximum level. Similarly, for the initial stock of
debt equal to 0.5 times the Mexican GDP, the debt ratio never reached its limit in 7,721 out
of 10,000 simulations.
Figure 4 shows a sample of simulated time series of the public debt ratio and illustrates
further how much the NDL and the sustainable debt ratios di®er. The ¯gure shows 20
simulations of debt-output ratios for a unique starting ratio equal to 30 percent, using the
parameters values calibrated to the Argentine economy. At each period t, a random draw
of public revenues along with the t-stock of debt and the ¯scal rules for public outlays are
used to determine the value of the debt at time t + 1. Notice that whereas for some paths
the debt ratio increases rapidly until it reaches the NDL, for other paths it takes a long time
to reach it and for other paths the debt goes to zero. As explained above, for a large range
of initial values of public debt, the model predicts that the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach the
debt limit while for some other initial values the debt ratio goes to zero. This implies that
24for starting values of the debt ratio above 0.30, the fraction of paths driving the debt to its
maximum level increases and that for starting values below 0.30 that fraction decreases.
Default Risk
Up to this point the analysis followed the methodology proposed by Mendoza and Oviedo
(2006) in which sovereign default was set aside to focus on modeling the optimal debt policy
consistent with ¯scal solvency and the desire to smooth public outlays. The only way in which
default risk was taken into account was in setting the value of the constant real interest rate
used to solve for the NDLs and to compute the debt dynamics. However, time-varying default
risk premia are an important feature of public debt in emerging markets. It may make sense
for a government to conduct a forward-looking debt sustainability exercise in which it is
assumed that there is no default risk, or that default risk is time invariant, as a benchmark
scenario, but it is important to study how the results vary when time-varying default risk is
introduced.
One important limitation of the analysis of default risk is that existing theoretical mod-
els of optimal sovereign debt contracts face serious challenges in explaining observed debt
ratios. The canonical model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) considers a risk-neutral lender
and a risk-averse borrower that has the option of defaulting at the cost of facing permanent
exclusion of the debt market. The lender is willing to take on the risk of default by charging
a rate of interest that incorporates a premium consistent with the probability of repayment.
There are well-known theoretical problems with this setup related to the classic Bulow-Rogo®
critique showing that the threat of exclusion may not be credible because of the option to
enter in deposit contracts with lenders. But even if the model were not a®ected by these
problems, recent quantitative studies show that optimal contracts of sovereign debt in the
Eaton-Gersovitz tradition support very small debt ratios of less than 10 percent of GDP (see
Arellano, 2006). This is because the models yield probabilities of default that increase too
rapidly at low levels of debt.
Faced with the di±culties in developing a complete theory of endogenous default risk, a
pragmatic approach is followed next; the approach takes into account the same risk-neutral
lender of the Eaton-Gersovitz model but incorporates an exogenous probability of repayment.







; a > 0 (7)
In this expression, Rw is the gross world risk-free real interest rate and ¸(bt) is the probability
of repayment (i.e., 1¡¸(bt) is the probability of default). The repayment probability is mod-
eled with an exponential probability distribution: exp(¡abt), where the curvature parameter
a determines the speed at which the repayment probability falls as debt increases.
The exponential formulation of default risk has the advantage that it is consistent with
two key properties of the optimal default probability of the Eaton-Gersovitz contract: (a) the
probability of default is increasing and convex on the level of debt and (b) the probability of
default is zero if the stock of debt is zero. The formulation fails to reproduce the property of
the Eaton-Gersovitz contract that the probability of default approaches 1 for a well-de¯ned
rationing level of debt at which debtors always ¯nd it preferable to default than to repay. In
the exponential formulation the probability of default approaches 1 asymptotically as debt
goes to in¯nity. However, the formulation still allows for values of a that would yield very
large risk premia for high levels of debt.
We calibrate the value of a so that the arbitrage condition in (7) holds taking as given
the EMBI+ country risk premium and the public debt ratio in Mexico in 1998, the year
of Mexico's maximum debt ratio in the 1990-2005 sample. Mexico's debt ratio in 1998 was
bt = 0:549 and the real interest rate that the country faced on this debt, measured as the
U.S. 90-day T-bill rate plus the EMBI+ spread, was R(bt) = 10:48 percent. The average
risk-free rate (i.e., the real U.S. 90-day T-bill rate) in 1998 was Rw =3.2 percent. Plugging
these ¯gures into (7), the equation holds for a = 0:124.
As shown below, default risk has two important implications for the analysis of sustainable
debt based on the MO model. First, it lowers the levels of NDLs, since the rate of interest
considered in Table 1 is lower than those resulting in the worst state of nature with default
risk. Second, it alters the dynamics of public debt since the rate of interest now increases
with the level of debt. These two e®ects result in lower NDLs, reduced levels of sustainable
debt and faster convergence to states of ¯scal crisis.
Table 2 shows the e®ects of introducing time-varying default risk in the calculations of
26the NDLs.6 All the estimates shown in this table assume that the risk free rate is set at the
1981-2005 average of the real 90-day T-bill rate, which is equal to 2.17 percent, and that the
curvature parameter of the probability of repayment is kept at a = 0:124.
The ¯rst panel of Table 2 shows how the benchmark estimates of the NDLs change when
default risk is introduced. These benchmark estimates take the same growth rates and min-
imum levels of public revenues and outlays as in the benchmark scenario of Table 1. The
resulting NDLs are signi¯cantly smaller (by 19.8 to 22.5 percentage points of GDP) than
those in the benchmark case without default risk. Note that this sharp decline of the NDLs
occurs despite the risk-free rate (at 2.17 percent) is below one half the long-run real interest
rate used in the benchmark scenario of Table 1. The repayment probabilities near 96 percent
and the default risk premia between 4.3 and 4.6 percent are similar across countries. The
NDLs in this case ensure that governments would be able to repay even during a ¯scal crisis,
but they still may choose to default on debt ratios about 0.33 with 4 percent probability.
The second panel of Table 2 shows how NDLs change in the growth slowdown scenario.
Again, relative to the growth slowdown scenario of Table 1, the risk-free rate is lowered from
5 to 2.17 percent and a time-varying default risk in introduced. To isolate the contribution
of the latter, the third panel of Table 2 shows the NDLs obtained using the growth rates of
the growth slowdown scenario but assuming that there is no default risk so that countries
can borrow at the 2.17 percent risk-free rate. Since this rate is less than half the one used in
Table 1, the resulting NDLs are high and above 100 percent of GDP for most countries.
Two comparisons are interesting to make using the second and third panels of Table 2.
First, the fact that the NDLs of the growth slowdown scenario in Table 1 (ranging from 34
to 44 percent of GDP among the examined countries) are much smaller than those of the
no-default-risk case in Panel 3 of Table 2 shows that the strategy of setting a long-run real
interest rate of 5 percent as a proxy for default risk in the estimates of Table 1 was not a bad
approximation. Second, the calculations of the NDLs of the second and third panels di®er
only because the second incorporates the time varying default risk premium (i.e., both have
the same risk-free rate of 2.17 percent). Since the NDLs without time-varying default risk
are several times larger than those with default risk, this comparison shows that default risk
6Note that with default risk, the constant rate of interest in the denominator of the formula for the NDL is
replaced with the interest rate including default risk de¯ned in equation (7). Since the interest rate depends
on the level of debt, the NDL is now the solution to a non-linear equation.
27has major implications for estimates of NDLs.
The last panel of Table 2 re-computes the required adjustment in outlays (i.e. the values
of gmin) needed to support the NDLs of the benchmark scenarios of Table 1 but now taking
into account time varying default risk. The adjustments in outlays are signi¯cantly larger
than those reported in Table 1. The required adjustment in outlays exceeds the two-standard
deviation threshold for all countries and it is larger for Mexico than for the other examined
countries (but still lower than for Argentina). Measured in terms of percentage points of
GDP, the adjustments are 5.10 percent in Mexico; 6.5 percent in Costa Rica; and 10 and 13.5
percent in Brazil and Colombia. This ranking (along with the similarities with the Argentine
results) suggests again that the debt positions of Brazil and Colombia are more di±cult to
reconcile with ¯scal solvency considerations than those of Costa Rica and Mexico.
Figure 5 illustrates the implications of default risk for the dynamics of public debt re°ected
by the relative frequency of a ¯scal crisis. The relative frequencies of ¯scal crises increase for
all countries and initial debt ratios when the interest rate incorporates a risk premium that
responds positively to public indebtedness. In other words, considering risk-adjusted interest
rates implies that countries hit more often their NDLs than when the interest rate is ¯xed.
In Mexico, for example, whereas an initial debt ratio of 40 percent has a zero probability of
leading to a ¯scal crisis under a ¯xed interest rate, that probability rises to 56 percent after
introducing default risk.
5 Conclusions, Caveats and Extensions
The application of the basic version of the MO model to the cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Mexico shows that public debt ratios in these countries are already close to their
natural debt limits; these are the debt limits that the countries should respect to preserve
the credibility of their perceived commitment to remain able to repay their debts. The result
arises after assuming a relatively optimistic scenario in which the growth slowdown of the
last two decades is reversed to recover the average per-capita growth rate observed between
1961 and 2005, and the ex ante real interest rate remains at a low level of 5 percent. This
baseline scenario is also optimistic in that it requires credible commitments to large cuts in
government outlays which recent experience indicates are a low-probability event. Consider-
28ing less optimistic scenarios in which growth continues at the trend of the last two decades
or the real interest rate increases to 8 percent, current debt ratios would be inconsistent with
a credible commitment to repay even with the same tough stance to cut outlays in a state of
¯scal crisis assumed in the baseline scenario.
The model predicts that the long-run dynamics of the debt ratio are undetermined; more
precisely, the model predicts that there is no unique, invariant limiting distribution for the
debt output ratio. This result needs to be considered carefully. On one hand, note that
the result does not require very strong assumptions: stochastic revenue, relatively in°exible
outlays and some limit to debt-market access (whether a NDL or some ad-hoc debt limit).
Also, the same outcome would result if outlays are given and instead one considers arguments
for tax smoothing as in Barro (1979). If these are the maintained assumptions of public
debt sustainability analysis, the stochastic simulations of debt ratios shown in Figures 2 to
4, together with the natural debt limits, summarize all relevant information for assessing
whether observed public debt dynamics are sustainable.
On the other hand, the assumptions that lead to the result of an indeterminate long-
run distribution of debt may be questionable. Instead of setting ad-hod rules, in the setup
proposed by Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), the government chooses its outlays optimally. It
is there assumed that the government is aimed to provide a smooth path of non-interest
outlays as it seeks to provide social insurance in a world where only non-contingent markets
exist to trade ¯nancial assets. In this setup, the government has a precautionary-savings
motive that yields a unique, invariant limiting distribution of public debt. Furthermore, the
role of the natural debt limit is clearer because the desire to respect it emerges not just
from an assumed commitment to remain able to repay, but from the fact that otherwise the
government is exposed to the risk of experiencing states in which its outlays can be very low,
and the government is very averse to these states because of the constant-relative-risk-aversion
nature of the utility function of public expenditures.
Most of the analysis in this paper is conducted giving a limited role to default risk by
simply setting a long-run, time-invariant real interest rate with a premium above the risk-free
rate. This was done following the approach of the MO model to provide a forward-looking
tool to design ¯scal programs with the explicit intention of preserving the government's ability
to ful¯ll its ¯nancial obligations. However, default risk is an important feature of emerging
29markets of sovereign debt, and hence it is worth adding it to the analysis of debt sustainability.
Default risk was introduced by adopting an exogenous, exponential probability of repay-
ment that varies with the level of debt. Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral and hence
willing to take default risk by lending at a rate that incorporates the premium that equates
the expected return of risky lending with the risk-free interest rate. Introducing this change
into the the basic version of the MO model produces smaller debt limits and speeds up the
dynamics that lead to states of ¯scal crisis in which NDLs are reached. NDLs that completely
ignore default risk support dynamic paths of sustainable debt with much higher debt ratios
than those obtained when default risk is introduced. However, since the basic MO model
approximates the long-run component of default risk by adding a constant premium above
the risk-free interest rate, it yields results for debt dynamics that are a much closer approxi-
mation to those produced by the model with time-varying default risk than those of a model
that ignores default risk completely.
The application of the MO model undertaken in this paper did not consider two other
important elements of dynamics of public debt in emerging economies: the endogeneity of the
tax bases and ¯scal policy choices and the role of ¯nancial frictions like liability dollarization.
The endogeneity of the tax bases can be incorporated into the structure of the MO model.
This requires introducing the decisions of the private sector with regard to the variables that
determine the allocations and prices that conform tax bases (such as labor supply, consump-
tion, the current account and capital accumulation), something that could be explored in
future research.
30Appendix: Data Sources
This appendix details the data sources used in the paper. Per-capita output growth rates
for all countries are from the World Development Indicators, a database maintained by the
World Bank and available at http://genderstats. worldbank.org/dataonline. U.S. 90-day T-
bill interest rates and the series of CPI are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's
databases.
Argentina. Data on public debt, output, and ¯scal revenues and non-interest outlays for
the period 1993-2005 were taken from the Economic Policy O±ce (Secretar¶ ³a de Pol¶ ³tica
Econ¶ omica) of the Argentine Ministry of Economy and Production (Ministerio de Econom¶ ³a
y Producci¶ on). See http://www.mecon.gov.ar. The data correspond to the national non-
¯nancial public sector and do not include state- and city-level data. For the period 1991-1992
the data on debt and ¯scal ratios were taken from Tables 1 and 2 of Rozenwurcel (1994).
Brazil. Data on ¯scal revenues and non-interest outlays refer to those of the national gov-
ernment (Uni~ ao), as published by the National Treasure (Tesouro Nacional) of the Brazilian
Ministry of Finance (Minist¶ erio da Fazenda). See http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br. Fiscal
revenues in the paper are the sum of all sources of current revenue plus all capital revenues
not associated with ¯nancial operations. Fiscal outlays are equal to the sum of current
outlays plus capital expenditures not associated to ¯nancial operations. The Brazilian Na-
tional Treasury reports revenues and outlays in reals (R$) of 2006 and the ratios to GDP
are constructed using the series of GDP in R$ of 2005 reported by the Brazilian Central
Bank (available at http://www.bcb.gov.br); before computing the ratios, the GDP series is
updated to 2006 prices by using the actualization coe±cient 1.0155298 (based on the price
index IGP-DI) reported by the Brazilian National Treasury. Data on debt-to-GDP ratios are
from the IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2003 and IMF country reports.
Chile. Data on debt and ¯scal revenues and non-interest outlays were taken from the Sta-
tistical Database of the Central Bank of Chile, available at http://www.bcentral.cl. Public
debt refers to the net total ¯nancial debt of the central government. Output data (National
Accounts, 1996 base year) were obtained from the same source although they are only avail-
31able from 1996 on; GDP data for the period 1990-1995 were obtained from Correa, et al.
(2002).
Colombia. The Colombian revenue and non-interest data were obtained from the Colom-
bian Central Bank (Banco de la Rep¶ ublica) which can be accessed from http://www.banrep.gov.co.
Data on ¯scal revenues and outlays refer to the overall non-¯nancial public sector. Public
debt ratios for the period 1993-1995 are from IMF, World Economic Outlook, September
2003; data for the period 1996-2005 are from the Central Bank of Colombia and correspond
to total net debt of the non-¯nancial public sector minus the external assets of the National
Treasury.
Costa Rica. The Costa Rican public revenues and non-interest outlays were obtained from
the Costa Rican National Treasury (Tesorer¶ ³a Nacional) of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio
de Hacienda) and comprise the central government, the central bank, and all other organisms
of the non-¯nancial public sector. Revenue and outlays ratios were computed using the series
of Costa Rican GDP provided by the same source. Deb-to-GDP ratios for the period 1992-
2002 are from IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2003; the 2003-2005 ratios were
estimated using the Costa Rican National Treasury data.
Mexico. The Mexican debt ratios are from are from IMF, World Economic Outlook,
September 2003, and from IMF country reports. The data on ¯scal revenues and non-interest
outlays as well as GDP data were obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estad¶ ³stica Geogr¶ a¯ca
e Inform¶ atica, INEGI, (http://www.inegi.gob.mx).
32Table 1: Fiscal Sector Statistics and Natural Debt Limits
1990-2005 (in percentages of GDP)




average 60.74 43.04 7.86 37.47 50.28 46.06
maximum 164.44 57.18 30.31 56.17 54.50 54.90
year of maximum 2002 2003 1990 2003 2003 1998
Public revenue
average 19.11 26.80 21.82 29.95 32.01 21.26
coe®. of variation 12.04 12.83 4.20 18.47 7.05 7.71
two-standard dev. Floor 14.51 19.92 19.99 18.89 27.49 17.99
Non-interest outlays
average 17.57 24.62 15.99 27.71 29.60 18.37
coe®. of variation 10.18 14.66 7.48 23.28 9.01 7.20
Average primary balance 1.53 2.18 5.83 2.24 2.41 2.89
Implied ¯scal adjustment2 2.92 2.55 -2.25 1.64 1.39 1.52
Implied minimum 12.35 18.38 18.69 17.12 25.88 16.36
non-interest outlays
Benchmark Natural Debt Limits and Blanchard Ratios
(1961-2005 growth rates, 5% real interest rate)
Growth rate 1.13 2.31 2.66 1.86 2.04 2.03
Natural debt limit3 55.69 57.18 55.69 56.17 54.50 54.90
Blanchard ratio 39.65 81.01 249.05 71.55 81.48 97.49
Growth Slowdown Scenario
(1981-2005 growth rates, 5% real interest rate, benchmark ¯scal adjustment)
Growth rate 0.49 0.45 3.45 1.22 1.33 0.81
Natural debt limit 46.61 33.83 82.28 42.03 43.93 38.91
Blanchard ratio 34.02 47.93 377.23 59.28 65.67 69.09
High Real Interest Rate Scenario
(1961-2000 growth rates, 8% real interest rate, benchmark ¯scal adjustment)
Growth rate 1.13 2.31 2.66 1.86 2.04 2.03
Natural debt limit 31.36 27.04 24.42 28.70 27.05 27.29
Blanchard ratio 22.33 38.31 109.21 36.56 40.43 48.47
Notes: The source of data is detailed in the Appendix.
1. The debt ratios in Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica correspond to the periods 1991-2005, 1992-2005,
and 1993-2005, respectively.
2. The implied ¯scal adjustment is the number of standard deviations relative to the mean needed to obtain
the benchmark natural debt limit. The minimum non-interest outlays are the values of these outlays consistent
with the implied ¯scal adjustment.
3. The natural debt limits of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico are equal to the largest public debt
ratios observed in each country's data; for Argentina and Chile, the natural debt limit is the average natural
debt limit in the other four countries. 33Table 2: Natural Debt Limits with Default Risk
Argen- Brazil Chile Colom- Costa Mexico
tina bia Rica
Benchmark NDLs with default risk1
Natural debt limit 36.82 34.93 33.22 36.63 34.71 34.86
Probability of repayment 95.52 95.74 95.95 95.66 95.77 95.75
Default risk premium 4.79 4.54 4.31 4.63 4.51 4.53
NDLs in the growth slowdown scenario with default risk
Natural debt limit 34.70 28.46 36.57 33.32 32.14 30.59
Probability of repayment 95.77 96.52 95.55 95.94 96.08 96.26
Default risk premium 4.51 3.69 4.76 4.33 4.17 4.17
NDLs in the growth slowdown scenario without default risk and risk free rate of 2.36%
Natural debt limit 127.75 89.35 - 183.93 191.68 119.82
Required ¯scal adjustment to support observed maximum debt ratios as NDLs2
Natural debt limit 55.69 57.18 55.69 56.17 54.50 54.90
Probability of repayment 93.30 93.13 93.30 93.25 93.44 93.39
Default risk premium 7.34 7.54 7.34 7.40 7.17 7.23
Implied min. non-int. outlays 9.49 14.63 16.62 14.19 23.13 13.27
relative to average outlays -8.09 -9.99 0.63 -13.51 -6.47 -5.10
in number of std. devs. 4.52 2.77 -0.53 2.10 2.43 3.85
Notes: Calculations done as described in the text, using a risk free rate of 2.17 percent, which is the 1981-2005
average of the in°ation-adjusted 90-day US T-bill rate, and a curvature parameter for the risk function of
a = 0:124. The value of a was calibrated to match the EMBI+ spread and the debt ratios observed in Mexico
in 1998.
1. Based on the benchmark values of growth rates and minimum revenue and outlays shown in Table 1.
2. Values of minimum outlays required to support maximum debt ratios shown in Table 1 as NDLs in the
setting with default risk, using growth rates from the benchmark scenario.
34Figure 1: Public Debt-GDP Ratios in Seven






















































































35Figure 2: Relative Frequency of Fiscal Crises for
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Notes: Results of 10,000 simulations of the basic MO model with country speci¯c
¯scal-revenue processes and (¯xed) government expenditures. For each country there
is a bar for each starting value of the debt ratio. The relative frequencies report the
probabilities of hitting a ¯scal crisis within the next 50 periods.
36Figure 3: Extreme Adverse Scenarios of Fiscal Crises
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Notes: Results of 10,000 simulations of the basic MO model with country speci¯c
¯scal-revenue processes and (¯xed) government expenditures. For each country, there
is a bar for each starting value of the debt ratio that indicates the minimum number
of periods that could take to hit a ¯scal crisis in the most adverse scenario.
37Figure 4: Simulations of Debt-to-GDP Ratios in Argentina with a
Starting Ratio of 30 Percent





































Notes: Results of 20 simulations of the basic MO model calibrated to Argentina. The
starting debt ratio in all simulations at t = 1 is 30 percent. From time t = 2 on,
random draws of tax revenues drive the dynamics of the debt ratio according to the
government's budget constraint and the ad-hoc decision rules of the model.
38Figure 5: Extreme Adverse Scenarios of Fiscal
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